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THE FIRST AMENDMENT APPLIED TO

BROADCASTING: A FEW MISGIVINGS
PAUL BATOR*

I have a very few rather iconoclastic and irreverent comments. There are three major reasons for having misgivings
about a proposal that the First Amendment should be used as
an instrument for deregulating the radio and television industries. The issue is not just the fairness doctrine' but the entire
constitutive scheme, the basis of which is that the licensee is a
trustee with public responsibility.
The first reason is this: When the proposal is made that the
First Amendment regime applicable to the press should simply
be transferred to broadcasting, I inescapably ask myself the
question "Do I like the content of that regime?" Should that
regime be extended to another industry? Misgivings about that
regime become a factor in the equation. It seems to me relevant, therefore, that our legal regime has, on the print media
side, contributed to the creation of an institution that is virulently unfair, entirely unsubstantive, and basically hostile to the
world of ideas, one that is irresponsible and extremely and uncontrollably powerful.
The "big print" media are a major constitutive force in the
debasement of our public life. This is primarily because our
media are so unsubstantive. This is an irony in view of the First
Amendment's ideal. The point of the First Amendment is to
create an open forum for ideas, but the one thing the public
press apparently fears and hates most is any actual reference to
substantive ideas. The press seems to me to be interested
predominantly in issues of personality, of who is up, who is
down, not what is said, but who has said it, and what that indicates about the flow of political life.
Is it the case that our existing First Amendment regime contributes to this debasement? I think so. The decision in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,2 which takes pressure off the
press to be a forum, a place where there is actually a First
Amendment debate, seems to me to contribute to the sense
* John P. Wilson Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

1. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982) & 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1910-73.1940 (1985).
2. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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that the press is entitled by the FirstAmendment to be unfair, to

give no play to debate or variety, and to be insensitive to the
problematical nature of ideas and opinions. The man from
Mars would think it odd that it is the First Amendment, which is
supposed to create a forum for ideas, that guarantees the right
of each publication to shut down the open forum for the debate
of ideas.
Similarly, there is an irony about New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' Why should the First Amendment so freely guarantee the
robust and uninhibited practice of lying? It is odd to say that
there should be no chill, or only minimal chill, on the right of
the press to tell untruths. The part of New York Times that says
you have to prove actual malice and that negligence is not malice seems to be a step in the wrong direction from the very
viewpoint of First Amendment ideals. These cases seem to me
to give cause for misgivings about the notion that we should
revolutionize the broadcast side and buy into a universe which
has created such a problematical institution in American life.
A second misgiving derives from the fact that it is a myth that
if we adopt an undiluted First Amendment universe for broadcasting, that is the equivalent of saying that we have deregulated broadcasting. All that we have done is substitute
regulation by the courts for regulation by the combination of
president, agency, and Congress that we now have on the
broadcast side. It is not the case that on the press side there is
no regulation. Rather, the courts exercise huge ad hoc discretion in overriding state and federal legislative and administative
judgments as to how much speech is permissible and what can
and cannot be forbidden. The reason is that the First Amendment, unhappily, does not generate fixed rules; it generates
rules that turn out to be differences of degree. In the end, many
scholars who are in disagreement are reduced to saying there
are differences of degree and somebody has to decide what degree is acceptable. It does not seem possible that Richard Epstein's notion, that if you drive these theories hard one gets
determinative rules, can be correct. It very much depends who
is doing the driving and on the political climate in the judiciary.
The question is whether one trusts the courts more than the
legislatures in drawing these distinctions of degree. Underlying
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

No. 1]

Bator

this is an institutional and methodological point. It is one of the
striking features of discourse in American constitutional law
that we think that the courts do not count as government when
we talk about the powers of government. We are always asking
whether the government should be restrained from doing
something, and somehow the courts are always outside the
sphere of those who count as coercers when they are issuing
decrees. Government by judges is as much government, is as
much coercion, as any other type of government, particularly in
an era where interpretivism is a difficult line to maintain and
where most differences are differences of degree. Suppose the
court says that the First Amendment prevents the state of Utah
from legislating to exclude pornographic shows from cable television. Once the court has made such a ruling, there will be
glowing editorials about how this prevents the government
from abridging our freedom. What has happened, however, is
that a local community, through various processes that are both
complicated and untidy, has reached a judgment about how it
wants its life to be regulated, and nine elderly justices from
thousands of miles away swoop down and say, "Oh no, you
can't do that." That is very coercive. That also is government.
Under the Fein proposal, the Supreme Court, rather than the
combination of Congress, agency, president and, if you will,
public opinion, will make these decisions. The question then is:
"Will the people-the industry, the listeners, and others-have
a more responsive symbiotic relationship with the courts than
with the group of actors-Congress, state legislatures, governors, administrative agencies-that have been the regulators
heretofore?" The problem of deregulation is the problem of
adapting a historically complicated, peculiar institution or set
of institutions to an atmosphere of changing technology. What
evidence is there that the courts have the ability in any kind of
sensitive or knowledgeable way to understand where deregulation should go, how fast it should go, and where it should be?
A third misgiving surrounds the proposition that there are
no relevant distinctions between the print media and broadcasting. And the question of course is whether any distinctions
are meaningful distinctions in terms of the First Amendment.
Print media and broadcasting are very different institutions.
They are different partly because, historically, the law has created different constitutive atmospheres, so that they have de-
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veloped in different ways. For fifty years the broadcast industry
has been a part of a structure that has pervasive and continuous
interaction with government and government decisionmaking.
In order to exist, the broadcast industry must enter into complex forms of cooperation with the public sector in a continuing way. (This does not exist with the print media. The fact that
the Post Office subsidizes some classes of mail is not a relevant
form of interaction.) Allocating the broadcast spectrum, both
in terms of horizontal rules and vertical rules, and the decision
whether the spectrum should be allocated in a way that-enables
local broadcasting to flourish or whether broadcasting should
be regional or even national-these are constitutive decisions
that the industry cannot make on its own. There are too many
interrelated aspects involved. On the cable side, there are aspects of a natural monopoly. Unlike setting up a newspaper
vending box where you put in your twenty-five cents, there are
not many opportunities in a single city to install a cable system.
Further, broadcasting is an industry that, for better or worse, is
suffused with enormous governmental ownership and subsidy.
There is a common intuition, common to many civilized societies, that we have in broadcasting, and particularly in television, a kind of resource which deserves a more complicated and
variegated system of distribution of ownership and control
than the press model would permit.
Finally, let me say a word about the "chilling effect" of regulation. Radio and television stations are pretty timid, but the
point of comparison for First Amendment purposes is the print
media. Is the Washington Post more open to fair debate than
CBS? Having spent two years in Washington in this administration, I would be horrified if I thought that the Washington Post
could buy CBS and be entirely free from governmental restraints in what it is allowed to say about the administration's
policies. There would not necessarily be an increase in debate if
the First Amendment were used to deregulate broadcasting.
There is less public debate and public programming in a small
local newspaper than on the small local television or radio station. The fact is that if we import conventional First Amendment doctrine into the broadcast industry, the chances are that
the amount of debate on political ideas will go down substan-

tially. Public affairs broadcasting, which is not commercially
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very remunerative, now goes on because of agency and governmental pressure. That is not a chilling effect.
Within the mass media, where does the First Amendment
function best? Where does one see a maximum of the flow and
debate of ideas? My perception is that the best job is done in
public radio and public television. Yet these are the most govemmentally scrutinized of the mass media. Government, not
only through the FCC rules, but through statutory rules and
subsidy, has an enormous impact on public radio and television. And there seems to be an odd and ironic discontinuity
between conventional First Amendment theory and the way
that these industries have in fact historically functioned.

